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Callbacks are essential in many programming environments, but drastically complicate program understanding
and reasoning because they allow to mutate object’s local states by external objects in unexpected fashions,
thus breaking modularity. The famous DAO bug in the cryptocurrency framework Ethereum, employed
callbacks to steal $150M. We define the notion of Effectively Callback Free (ECF) objects in order to allow
callbacks without preventing modular reasoning.
An object is ECF in a given execution trace if there exists an equivalent execution trace without callbacks
to this object. An object is ECF if it is ECF in every possible execution trace. We study the decidability of
dynamically checking ECF in a given execution trace and statically checking if an object is ECF. We also show
that dynamically checking ECF in Ethereum is feasible and can be done online. By running the history of all
execution traces in Ethereum, we were able to verify that virtually all existing contract executions, excluding
these of the DAO or of contracts with similar known vulnerabilities, are ECF. Finally, we show that ECF,
whether it is verified dynamically or statically, enables modular reasoning about objects with encapsulated
state.
CCS Concepts: • Theory of computation → Program analysis; • Software and its engineering →
Dynamic analysis;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Program analysis, Modular reasoning, Smart contracts
1 INTRODUCTION
The theme of this paper is enabling modular reasoning about the correctness of objects with
encapsulated state. This is inspired by platforms like Ethereum [Wood 2016] that facilitate execution
of Smart Contracts [Szabo 1997] on top of a blockchain-based distributed ledger [Nakamoto 2008].
A key property in Ethereum Smart Contracts is the lack of global mutable shared state, in contrast
to common standard programming environments such as C and Java. A smart contract is analogous
to an object with encapsulated state.
However, the Ethereum blockchain, and many other dynamic environments, implement event-
driven programming using callbacks. These callbacks are necessary for functionality, but can
compromise security. For example, the famous bug in the DAO contract exploited callbacks to steal
$150M [Daian 2016].
Indeed, callbacks may break modularity which is essential for good programming style and
extendibility. In the context of Blockchain, modularity is even more important since contracts are
contributed by different sources, some of which may be malicious. Accordingly, the bug in the DAO
allowed an adversarially crafted contract to mutate the DAO’s state by calling back to it.
The DAO contract, that implemented a crowd-funding platform, was attacked by a ‘callback
loop-hole’ (to be precisely described below). This attack, the recovery from which required a
controversial hard-fork of the blockchain,1 exhibits a vulnerability that is peculiar to decentralized
1A hard fork can be thought of as taking an agreed history of transactions, and manually change it.
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consensus systems, like Ethereum: in such systems, a buggy contract cannot be updated or fixed
(except for extreme measures like hard-forking), which makes validation and verification of smart
contracts of even greater importance for this application.
Effectively Callback-Free Objects. We identify a natural generic correctness criteria for objects
which enables modular reasoning in environments with local-only mutable states, and expect most
correct objects to satisfy this requirement. Informally, if an object o calls another object o′, and
the execution of o′ calls o again, this second call to o is defined as a callback. The main idea is to
allow callbacks in o only when they cannot affect the serial non-interruptible behavior of o. Thus,
such callbacks can be considered harmless and do not affect the set of local reachable states of the
object o. In particular, the behavior of such objects is independent of the client environments and
of other objects. It is possible to reproduce all behaviors of the object using a most general client
and without analyzing external objects.
We say that an execution is Dynamically Effectively Callback Free (dECF) when there exists
“an equivalent” execution without callbacks which starts in the same state and reaches the same
final state. By equivalent, we refer to the behavior of a particular object as an external observer
may perceive. We say that an object is Statically Effectively Callback Free (sECF) when all its
possible executions are dynamically ECF. We do not distinguish between dynamic and static ECF
when the context is clear. Both definitions are useful. Dynamic ECF in particular is applicable to the
blockchain environment, since static ECF is undecidable in the general case. We ran experiments
on Ethereum, proving that checking dynamic ECF is inexpensive, and thus can be done efficiently
in-vivo. This, combined with Ethereum’s built-in rollback feature, would have allowed to prevent
the DAO bug from occurring, without invalidating legitimate executions. (In fact, we found just
one such legitimate non-ECF contract, discussed in Section 9).
We show that the vulnerable DAO contract is non-ECF while no non-ECF executions are detected
after applying the suggested corrections to it. Notice that the ECF notion is similar to the notion of
atomic transactions in concurrent systems. Indeed, despite the fact that contract languages do not
usually support concurrency, modularity and callbacks require similar kind of reasoning.
The ECF property’s usefulness is not limited to bug-finding; once ECF is established, it can be
served to simplify reasoning on the object in isolation of other objects: We show that the set of
reachable local states in ECF objects can be determined without considering the code of other
objects and thus enable modular reasoning. This modular reasoning can be performed automatically
using abstract interpretation e.g., as suggested in Logozzo [2009] or by using deductive verification
which is supported by Dafny [Leino 2010]. We demonstrate this by verifying an interesting invariant
of the DAO contract. (See Section 2).
Online Detection of ECF executions. A naïve detection of dECF may be costly because of the
need to enumerate subexecution traces. Therefore, we develop an effective polynomial online
algorithm for checking if an execution is ECF. The main idea is to detect conflicting memory
accesses and utilize commutativity in an effective manner. We integrated the algorithm into the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [Wood 2016]. We ran the algorithm on all executions kept in the
Ethereum blockchain until 23 June 2017, and demonstrate that: (i) the vulnerable DAO contract and
other buggy contracts are non-ECF. (ii) very few correct contracts are non-ECF, (iii) callbacks are
not esoteric and are used in many contracts, and (iv) the runtime overhead of our implementation
is negligible and thus can be integrated as an online check.
This online detection can thus be used to prevent incidents like the theft from the DAO at the
cost of slightly more restricted form of programming.
As far as we are aware, our tool is also the most precise and effective tool for finding such
vulnerable behaviors due to callbacks. We compared it to the Oyente tool [Luu et al. 2016; Melonport
2017], by giving it both ECF and non-ECF contracts based on the DAO object (Figure 1). We found
that it has false positives, as it detects a ‘reentrancy bug’ (the common name of the DAO vulnerability
in the blockchain community) for any one of the fixes that render our example contract ECF.
Decidability of sECF for objects. We also consider the problem of checking sECF algorithmically.
Obviously, since modern contract languages, such as Solidity [Ethereum Foundation 2017b], are
Turing complete, checking if a contract is ECF is undecidable.
We show that checking that a contract is sECF in a language with finite local states is decidable.
This is interesting since many contracts only use small local states or maps with uniform data
independent accesses. Technically, this result is non-trivial since the nesting of contract calls is
unbounded, and since ECF requires reasoning about permutations of nested invocations. The reason
for the decidability is that non-ECF executions which occur in high depth of nesting must also
occur in depth 2.
Main Results. Our results can be summarized as follows:
(1) We define a general safety property, called ECF, for objects (sECF) and executions (dECF).
Our definition is inspired by the Blockchain environment but it may also be useful for other
environments with encapsulated states, such as Microservices.
(2) We show that objects with encapsulated data, under the assumption that they satisfy ECF,
can be verified using modular reasoning in a sound manner.
(3) A stronger notion of ECF, based on conflict-equivalence, enabling efficient verification of
dECF in real-life environments, and for which sECF is decidable for programs with finite
state and unbounded stack.
(4) A polynomial time and space algorithm for online checking of dECF and prototype imple-
mentation of it as a dynamic monitor of dECF, built on top of an Ethereum client.
(5) Evaluation of the algorithm on the entire history of the Ethereum blockchain (both main
and ‘Classic’ forks, see Section 9). The monitor detects true bad executions (the infamous
DAO and others) as non-ECF, and has near-zero false positives. Based on this result, it can
be inferred that, in practice, most non-ECF executions correspond to bad executions. We
also show that our monitor has a very small runtime overhead. By retroactively running the
dECF monitor on the available history, we were able to prove its effectiveness in preventing
the exploitation of the vulnerability in the DAO, and even more importantly, the feasibility
of leveraging it in other applications, e.g., simplifying modular contract verification.
2 OVERVIEW
This section provides some necessary background and an informal overview of our approach.
2.1 The DAO Bug
Figure 1 shows pseudocode illustrating the vulnerability in the DAO.2 The contract stores a credit
for each object, as well as the current balance.3 The credit represents individual investments per
object. To align with the Ethereum terminology, the unit of currency represented by credit and
balance is called ether. The contract maintains a representation invariant, where the sum of the
credits equals to the current balance, i.e.,
Σo∈dom(credit)credit[o] = balance (1)
2DAO is acronym for decentralized autonomous organization, and its purpose is to facilitate voting on proposals and on
investments by the owners of the DAO.
3In programming languages like Solidity, balance is a predefined field of every contract, maintained by the runtime system.
We write it explicitly for clarity.
Object DAO
Map<Object, int> credit
int balance
Invariant (sum o: credit[o]) = balance
Method withdrawAll(Object o) Method deposit(Object o, int amount)
2: if (oCredit > 0) 6: credit[o] += amount
// 2.5: credit[o] = 0 7: this.balance += amount
3: this.balance -= oCredit
4: o.pay(oCredit)
5: credit[o] = 0
Fig. 1. A contract illustrating the DAO bug. The representation invariant may be violated by callbacks from
malicious contracts. Line 2.5 fixes the bug.
Object GoodClient
Object Dao, int balance
Method init(Object dao)
1: this.Dao = dao
Method pay(int profit)
2: this.balance += profit
Method depositCredit(Object dao, int amount)
3: Dao.deposit(this, amount)
Method getCredit(Object dao)
4: Dao.withdrawAll(this)
(a) An innocent client using the DAO object without
violating its representation invariant.
Object Attacker
Object Dao, bool stop, int balance
Method init(Object dao)
1: Dao = dao
2: stop = false
Method pay(int profit)
3: this.balance += profit
4: if (!stop)
5: stop = true
6: Dao.withdrawAll(this)
7: stop = false
(b) A snippet of an Attacker object. It is stealing
money from the DAO object by violating its repre-
sentation invariant.
Fig. 2. An innocent and a malicious client using the DAO object
The contract offers two methods for manipulating states: deposit for depositing money and
withdrawAll for withdrawing all available funds of a specific object.
Figure 2a shows a simple client illustrating the expected usages of the DAO object. Figure 2b shows
a simple attack on the DAO object. The code callbacks to the DAO method withdrawAll to steal
money. Figure 3 depicts a concrete trace of attacking the DAO assuming that the DAO’s initial balance
is 200 ether. We reached that state after a GoodClient object and an Attacker object deposited each
100 ether. In the first call to withdrawAll, the attacker will get the amount he invested originally in
the attack (100 ether). The DAO then calls to the Attacker object’s paymethod, which increases the
attacker’s balance by 100 ether, and calls withdrawAll again. The pay method is designed to call
withdrawAll at most once in a trace by updating the stop variable, and avoid infinite recursion.4
The code of withdrawAll in the second run will transfer an additional 100 ether from the DAO
object to the attacker. In the end of the trace, the DAO was depleted of its funds completely, and the
attacker managed to illegitimately receive the funds that belonged to GoodClient.
4For clarity, we avoid technical discussion of the semantics of executions and exceptions in Ethereum/Solidity, to allow us
to focus on the ECF property.
D.c[G] = 100
D.c[A] = 100
D.b = 200
A.b = 0
A.s = false
w {
1
// read D.c[A] = 100
D.b = 100
p {
2
// A.b = 100
A.s = true
w {
3
// read D.c[A] = 100
D.b = 0
p {
4
// A.b = 200
A.s = true
p }
5
tt
D.c[A] = 0 w }
6
// A.s = false
p }
7
// D.c[A] = 0 w }
8
//
D.c[G] = 100
D.c[A] = 0
D.b = 0
A.b = 200
A.s = false
Fig. 3. A trace of calls illustrating an attack on the DAO. Nodes are labeled by local changed states and edges
are labeled by actions and by the corresponding order in the original trace. D denotes the DAO, G denotes
a GoodClient and A is an Attacker object. w denotes the withdrawAll operation and p denotes the pay
operation. b is a shorthand for balance, c is a shorthand for credit, and s is a shorthand for stop.
D.c[G] = 100
D.c[A] = 100
D.b = 200
A.b = 0
A.s = false
w {
1
// D.c[A] = 0
D.b = 100
p {
2
// A.b = 100
A.s = true
w {
3
// read D.c[A] = 0 w }
4
// A.s = false
p }
5
// w }
6
//
D.c[G] = 100
D.c[A] = 0
D.b = 100
A.b = 100
A.s = false
D.c[G] = 100
D.c[A] = 100
D.b = 200
A.b = 0
A.s = false
w {
1
// D.c[A] = 0
D.b = 100
w }
6
// p {
2
// A.b = 100
A.s = true
w {
3
// read D.c[A] = 0 w }
4
// A.s = false
p }
5
//
D.c[G] = 100
D.c[A] = 0
D.b = 100
A.b = 100
A.s = false
Fig. 4. Two traces of calls illustrating the original and callback-free versions of a failed attack on the ECF
version of the DAO.
2.2 Effectively Callback Free Contracts
In principle, semi-automatic program verification and abstract interpretation can be used to verify
the absence of malicious attacks like the one in the Attacker object. However, this requires
reasoning about the whole code.5 This paper advocates a different solution by exploring modularity.
The idea is to require stronger conditions from the contracts which prevent the need to reason
about other objects at all.
Specifically, we define the notion of effectively callback free (ECF) objects. Our definition is
inspired by Blockchain contracts but is applicable to enforce modularity in other environments
with local states.
We say that an execution of an object with an initial state s0 and final state s is Dynamically
Effectively Callback Free (dECF) when there exists “an equivalent” execution of the contract
without callbacks which starts in the same initial state s0 and reaches the final state s . We say
5In the case of Ethereum, it is in fact impossible to reason about the whole code, as new contracts can be added at any time,
and these contracts could interact with the contract being checked.
that an object is Statically Effectively Callback Free (sECF) when all its possible executions are
effectively callback free.
The DAO object is not ECF. For example, the trace depicted in Figure 3 cannot be reproduced
without callbacks to reach the same state. In contrast, the fix to the DAO object by uncommenting
line 2.5 and deleting line 5 makes the contract ECF. This contract is now ECF since all its traces
can be reordered to avoid callbacks. For example, Figure 4 shows a trace of an attempt to perform
an attack similar to the attack in Figure 3 and its corresponding reordering that avoids callbacks.
Note, that in the reordered trace, withdrawAll did not execute line 4. Omitting calls is allowed for
the sake of proving an execution is ECF, as our goal is to be able to reproduce, assuming there are
no callbacks, the same behaviors that are feasible with callbacks.
2.3 Online ECF Detection
It is possible to check in a naïve way that an execution is ECF by recording the trace and checking
the ECF property at the end of the execution, by enumerating all possible permutations. However,
this is costly both in space and in time, since the number of permutations grows exponentially
with the size of the trace. In particular, it is hard to see if such a solution can be integrated into a
virtual machine.
In order to obtain a feasible online algorithm, we check a stronger requirement than ECF, which
is inspired by conflict serializability of database transactions. The main idea is to explore commuta-
tivity of operations for efficient online checking of a correctness condition which guarantees that
the callback-free trace results in the same state as the original trace.
Consider a trace π with potential callbacks and a reordered trace π ′ which does not include
callbacks. π ′ is not necessarily feasible, unless we permit to ignore external calls by objects and
force the clients to perform these calls instead. We say that π and π ′ are conflict equivalent if
every pair of conflicting read/write operations in π appear in the same order in π ′. Operations
conflict when they are not commutative. Commutativity is mechanically checked by comparing
the read and the write sets of operations, and forbidding intersection of read/write conflicts. For
example, in Figure 3, the read operation of D.c[A] in the withdrawAll action labeled 1 (lines 1-3)
does not commute with the write operation of D.c[A] in the withdrawAll action labeled 5 (line 5).
However, the top trace in Figure 4, depicting a trace of the ECF version of DAO, the operations in the
withdrawAll action labeled 3 (lines 1-2) commute with the operations in the withdrawAll action
labeled 6, which has an empty read and write sets (no code was executed since line 5 was deleted).
The information regarding commutativity of different subtraces is used to build a constraint graph
on the ordering of object invocations. When this constraint graph contains no cycles, it is possible
to perform topological sort to find a concrete callback-free trace. A full description of the algorithm
and its complexity is available in Section 8.
We integrated this algorithm into the EVM (the Ethereum Virtual Machine) and applied it to all
available executions in the blockchain. The results are summarized in Section 9. They indicate
that the vast majority of non-ECF executions come from erroneous contracts. They also indicate
that the runtime overhead of our instrumentation is neglectable. From these encouraging results,
we concluded that if the ECF check was part of the Ethereum protocol, it could have prevented
the vulnerability in the DAO from being exploited. Its clearly beneficiary for an environment like
Ethereum, which handles sensitive financial transactions, and in which code is virtually impossible
to upgrade.
2.4 Deciding ECF Contracts
We also investigated the possibility to verify at compile-time that a contract is ECF (the sECF
property). In general, this is undecidable, since languages such as Solidity, a high-level front-end to
c ∈ PCmd def= x B e | F B x | x B F | assert(b) | x B o(e) | skip | enter | return
C ∈ Cmd def= c | C ; C | if b then C else C | whileb do C
K ∈ Contract def= k : f enter var x C return
Fig. 5. Syntax.
EVM bytecode, are Turing-complete. However, we show that for contracts with finite local states,
checking ECF is decidable. This result is non-trivial as the model allows for an unbounded stack
length. The decision procedure devised provides insight on additional techniques for checking ECF
in practice.
2.5 Verifying Properties of ECF Contracts
In this paper, we show that reasoning about ECF contracts can be performed in a modular fashion.
The local reachable states of an ECF contract are only affected by the code of the contract, and
cannot be changed by external contracts.
This is useful for program verification and program analysis, treating external calls as non-
deterministic operations that may return an arbitrary value, but cannot change the local state. We
utilized this property using Dafny [Leino 2010], to verify correctness of the revised DAO object from
Figure 1 (including line 2.5, excluding line 5). When doing so, we ignored the call in line 4, because
the return value was not used. We provide a deeper discussion on verifying this example using
Dafny in Section 7.
2.6 Summary of the Rest of This Paper
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 3 we formally present the syntax and semantics
of our programming language for contracts, called SMAC. Notions of equivalence are presented
in Section 4. The ECF property and its different ‘flavors’ (dynamic vs. static, and for different
equivalence notions) are presented in Section 5. We discuss decidability results for ECF in Section 6.
Section 7 shows the application of the ECF property to achieve modular object-level analysis. The
algorithm for online verification of dECF is given in full in Section 8. We discuss our experimental
results obtained by running the algorithm on the Ethereum blockchain in Section 9. Related work
is provided in Section 10 and we conclude in Section 11.
3 PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE
We formalize our results for SMAC, a simple imperative object-based programming language
with pass-by-value parameters with integer-typed local variables and data members (fields). For
simplicity, and without loss of generality, every method has a single formal parameter named
arg and returns a value by assigning it to a designated variable ret. Even though we present our
theoretical development for contracts in SMAC, for readability we use a Java-like notation in our
examples, which can be easily desugared.
3.1 Syntax
Figure 5 defines the syntax of SMAC. We assume infinite syntactic domains of k ∈ Cnt, f ∈ Fld,
and x ∈ Var contract identifiers, field names, and variable identifiers, respectively. A contract K is
identified by a (unique) contract identifier k , and contains a sequence of field definitions f and
a (single) nameless contract method. The contract method is comprised of a sequence of local
variable definitions x and a command C ∈ Cmd. C may be a primitive command c ∈ PCmd or
ρ ∈ Reg =Var ⇀fin Z Local states
ψ ∈Heap = Fld→fin Z Object states
γ ∈ Frame=Cnt × Cmd × Reg Frames
Γ ∈ Stack= Frame Stacks
σ ∈ Store =Cnt ⇀fin Heap Stores
s ∈ State = Stack × Store States
Fig. 6. Semantic domains.
⟨ϵ,σ ⟩ ⇒ ⟨(o, κ(o), [arg 7→ n]), σ ⟩
⟨(o, return, ρ), σ ⟩ ⇒ ⟨ϵ,σ ⟩
⟨(o, x B o′(e), ρ) · γ , σ ⟩ ⇒ ⟨(o′,κ(o′), [arg 7→ ρ(e)]) · (o, x B res, ρ) · γ ,σ ⟩
⟨(o′, return, ρ ′) · (o, c, ρ) · Γ,σ ⟩ ⇒ ⟨(o, c, ρ[res 7→ ρ ′(ret)]) · Γ,σ ⟩
Fig. 7. Operational semantics with a context κ. ρ is naturally extended for expressions over variables in LVar.
We denote o ∈ dom(σ ),n ∈ N.
a compound command, i.e., a sequential composition of commands, a conditional, or a loop. A
primitive command c ∈ PCmd may be either an assignment of an expression e to a local variable x
(x B e), an assignment of the value of a local variable x to a field F (F B x ), an assignment of the
value of a field F to a local variable x (x B F ), an assert command (assert(b)), a call to a contract
method with a single argument e , keeping the returned value in a local variable x (x B o(e)), or
a skip command. Each contract has a single method, thus methods are not named, and may be
colloquially referred to using the name of their contract.
Without loss of generatility, we assume that no two contracts contain a field with the same name.
In the following, we use the terms ‘contract’ and ‘object’ interchangeably.
3.2 Semantics
SMAC has a rather mundane stack-based operational semantics, which handle method calls using
a stack of activation records (frames), and uses a store to record the values stored in object fields.
We refer to a state in which the stack is empty as a quiescent state and to a non-quiescent state as
an active state. Once the execution reaches a quiescent state, any object method may start running.
We refer the reader’s attention to three important points: (i) contract states are encapsulated: A
contract o can only access its own fields, (ii) local variables are private to their invocation, and
(iii) once a contract method is invoked, the semantics is deterministic. We denote the code context
(context for short) which provides the code of every called object by κ ∈ Cnt ⇀f in Cmd, i.e., κ(o)
denotes the code of object o.
States. Figure 6 defines the semantic domains. A state s = ⟨Γ,σ ⟩ is a pair comprised of a (possibly
empty) stack of frames Γ ∈ Stack and a store σ ∈ Store, denoted by Γ(s) = Γ and σ (s) = σ ,
respectively. The depth of a state s , denoted by Depth(s), is the number of elements in its stack, i.e.,
Depth(s) = |Γ(s)|.
We denote the top of the stack in an active state s = ⟨Γ,σ ⟩ by top(s) = Γ(1). Intuitively, top(s)
contains the local state of the active (i.e., currently executing) contract method, while the other
frames record the locals states of pending calls to contract methods. A frame γ = (o, c, ρ) records
the local state of (a call to the contract method of) an object. Formally, γ is a triple comprised
of an object identifier, denoted by o(γ ) = o, a command, denoted by C(γ ) = c , which the method
needs to execute, and a local environment ρ ∈ Reg, denoted by ρ(γ ) = ρ, which assigns values
to the invocation’s local variables. A store σ ∈ Store is a mapping from a finite number of object
identifiers to their object state.
Transition relations. We formalize the semantics of our programming language using a transition
relation. A transition is a pair τ = (s, s ′) ∈ Tr ⊆ State × State comprised of a source state s , denoted
by src(τ ), and target state s ′, denoted by trg(τ ). For clarity, we sometimes write a τ = (s, s ′) as
s ⇒ s ′. We denote the active object of the transition by o(τ ) = o(top(src(τ ))), or omain if it starts in
a quiescent state. We denote by c(τ ) ∈ PCmd the primitive command that justifies the transition.
The meaning of primitive and compound commands is standard, and thus omitted. We mention
that primitive commands can only use local variables taken from the top stack frame, and that only
the fields of the active object can be accessed.
Figure 7 defines meaning of method calls and returns. When an object o is called from a quiescent
state, a new stack frame is pushed to the currently empty stack. The frame determines that the
active object is o, the command executing is the code κ(o) of o, and the local environment for the
invocation is the assignment of the value of n to arg. The last command in κ(o) is always a return,
after which the frame is popped, leading to a quiescent state. When a call x B o′(e) is made from an
active state, a new stack frame is pushed as in the previous case. We note that the local environment
is initialized by assigning to arg the value of e in the local environment belonging to the caller,
ρ(e). To handle retrieval of the return value from the callee, the command in the caller is modified
to assign to x the value of a specially designated variable res. When the callee invocation of o′
finishes, the command in the top frame is return and we let ρ ′ denote the local environment of
the callee. The control transfers back to the caller object o, and the value of res is set to be the
value of ret in ρ ′. The assigned value of res is then automatically assigned to x , as determined by
the operational semantics of the call. The primitive command associated with a call is enter, and
with a return is return.
Executions. An execution π = π (1) . . . π (|π |) is a finite sequence of transitions coming from
Tr . An execution π is well-formed if the target state of every transition is the source state of the
following one, i.e., ∀i ∈ {2..|π |}. trg(π (i − 1)) = src(π (i)). For clarity, we sometimes write an
execution π as π = s1 ⇒ s2 ⇒ · · · sn . We use κ ⊢ π to denote that an execution π takes objects’
code from context κ. We omit the context when no confusion is likely.
We say that a transition τ appears in a π , denoted by τ ∈ π , if π = _ · τ · _. We say that a state s
appears in a π , denoted by s ∈ π , if there is a transition τ ∈ π such that s ∈ {src(τ ), trg(τ )}.We denote
the sets of transitions and states that appear in an execution π by States(π ) and Transitions(π ),
respectively. An execution π ′ is a subexecution of an execution π , denoted by π ′ ⊑ π , if it is a
subsequence of π .
We denote the first and last states of a non-empty execution π by src(π ) = src(π (1)) and
trg(π ) = trg(π (|π |)). We say that π = τπ ′τ ′ is a complete execution if src(π ) and trg(π ) are quiescent
states and π ′ contains only active states. A run is a concatenation of complete executions executed
in the same code context κ, By abuse of notation, we use π to denote runs as well as executions. In
case we want to make the code context κ of the run explicit, we write κ ⊢ π .
The minimal and maximal depths of a non-empty execution π , denoted by minDepth(π ) =
min{Depth(s) | s ∈ States(π )} and maxDepth(π ) = max{Depth(s) | s ∈ States(π )} are the minimal,
respectively, maximal depths of any of the states it contains.
Awell formed execution π ′ is an invocation in an execution π if there exist transition τ and τ ′ such
that π = _·τ ·π ′ ·τ ′ ·_, whereDepth(src(τ )) = Depth(trg(τ ′)) andminDepth(π ′) = Depth(src(τ ))+1.
We refer to Depth(trg(τ )) as the depth of the invocation π ′ and denote it by Depth(π ′). Note that
according to this definition, the depth of an invocation that results from calling a contract method
on a quiescent state is one.
Traces. We define an event as a pair e = (o,a), consisting of an object o, and a primitive command
a. Each transition τ can be transformed to an event by e(τ ) = (o(τ ), c(τ )). The object and primitive
command of an event are can be retrieved with o(e) and a(e), respectively. A trace is a sequence
of events, denoted by T . The trace matching an execution π is received by point-wise application
of e(·) on all the transitions in π , denoted T (π ). We denote by T |o the maximal subsequence of T
comprised of events whose object is o.
4 EXECUTION EQUIVALENCE
We define two notions of equivalence of runs (sequences of complete executions) with respect to a
given (arbitrary) object o: final-state equivalence and conflict equivalence.
4.1 Object-Final-State Equivalence
Definition 4.1. Runs κ1 ⊢ π1 and κ2 ⊢ π2 are object-final-state equivalent for an object o, denoted
by κ1 ⊢ π1 ≃oFS κ2 ⊢ π2, if their respective first and last states have the same store for o, and their
code contexts agree on o:
κ1 ⊢ π1 ≃oFS κ2 ⊢ π2 ⇐⇒
σ (src(π1))(o) = σ (src(π2))(o) ∧ σ (trg(π1))(o) = σ (trg(π2))(o) ∧ κ1(o) = κ2(o)
Remark 4.2. Note that in Definition 4.1 it may be that κ1 , κ2 as long as κ1 and κ2 map o to the
same code.
4.2 Object Conflict-Equivalence
Conflicts. Two primitive commands a and a′ conflict, denoted by Conflict(a, a′), if both access
the same field and at least one of these accesses is a write.
Remark 4.3. Recall that we assume that object states are comprised of integer-typed data members
(fields); thus it is possible to detect the heap locations they access from the (syntactic) primitive
commands that they execute. Furthermore, recall that different objects contain different fields and an
object cannot directly access the fields of another; thus if two primitive commands conflict then they
must be executed by the same active object.
Modular Well-Formed Executions. We extend the definition of well-formed executions to modular
well-formed executions, which allow to replace the subexecution resulting from amethod invocation
x B o′(e) by an assignment of arbitrary value to x . We refer to such an (implicit) transition as a
havoc transition. Intuitively, a havoc transition allows to safely overapproximate the only effect
that an object o may observe from the invocation of a method on an object o′.
Definition 4.4. A havoc transition, denoted by s ⇝ s ′, is a pair of states ⟨s, s ′⟩ ∈ State × State
such that s = ⟨(o, x B o′(e), ρ) · Γ,σ ⟩ and s ′ = ⟨(o, done, ρ[res 7→ n]) · Γ,σ ⟩ for any values of o,
o′, e , ρ, Γ, σ and n.
Definition 4.5. Amodular well-formed execution is a finite sequence of transitions coming from Tr
such that for any consecutive transitions τ1τ2 it contains, the target state of τ1 and the source state
of τ2 are either (i) equal, i.e., trg(τ1) = src(τ2), or (ii) induce a havoc transition, trg(τ1)⇝ src(τ2).
By abuse of notations, we use π to denote modular well-formed executions too. A sequence of
transitions π is a complete modular well-formed run if it is modular well-formed and its first and
last states are quiescent. Such a run is a complete modular well-formed execution if, in addition, all
other states are active.
Projected Executions. We definewhat is the projection of an execution on an object, called projected
execution. The definition readily generalizes to any sequence of transitions.
Definition 4.6. Let π be an execution. The projected execution of π on o, denoted by π |o , is the
subsequence of π comprised of the transitions whose active object is o.
Lemma 4.7. For any execution π and object o it holds that T (π |o) = T (π )|o .
It will be useful in the following sections to consider modular well-formed executions yielded
by a projection on an object o. The following proposition states that it is possible to reverse that
projection, namely, to find a minimal well-formed execution that, when projected, yields the
modular well-formed execution we started with.
Proposition 4.8. Let κ ⊢ π be a modular well-formed execution where all transitions have the
same active object o. Then there is a context κ ′ such that κ ′(o) = κ(o) and an execution κ ′ ⊢ π ′ such
that T (π ) is a subsequence in T (π ′) and κ ′ ⊢ π ′ is well-formed. In addition, such an execution κ ′ ⊢ π ′
is minimal in the sense that T (π |o) = T (π ′ |o)
Finally, we present the definition for execution conflict equivalence with respect to an object o.
Definition 4.9. Let κ1 ⊢ π1 and κ2 ⊢ π2 be modular well-formed runs and T1 = T (π1 |o) and
T2 = T (π2 |o) be their the traces of their respective projections on o. κ1 ⊢ π1 and κ2 ⊢ π2 are object
conflict-equivalent for an object o, denoted π1 ≃oC π2, if:
(i) κ1(o) = κ2(o),
(ii) |T1 | = |T2 |,
(iii) there exists a permutation φ : {1..|T1 |} → {1..|T1 |} such that:
(a) for any i ∈ {1..|T1 |} it holds that T1(i) = T2(φ(i)), and
(b) for any i, j ∈ {1..|T1 |}, if Conflict(a(T1(i)), a(T1(j))) then i < j ⇐⇒ φ(i) < φ(j).
5 CORRECTNESS CONDITIONS
In this section we give a formal definition for two notions of the ECF property: final-state ECF and
conflict ECF. We start by formally defining callbacks and callback-freedom in executions.
A stack frame γ is a callback frame (to object o(γ )) in a stack Γ if there exist stack frames γ ′ and
γ ′′ such that Γ = _γ ′′_γ ′_γ_ and o(γ ) = o(γ ′′), but o(γ ) , o(γ ′). A stack Γ contains a callback (to
o), denoted by CBo(Γ), if it contains a callback frame. A state s contains a callback (to o), denoted
by CBo(s), if its stack does, and an execution π contains a callback (to o), denoted by CBo(π ), if
it contains a state s such that CBo(s). A stack resp. state resp. execution is callback-free (for o),
denoted by CBfo (Γ) resp. CBfo (s) resp. CBfo (π ), if it does not contain a callback.
We now define what it means for an execution to be effectively callback free, or ECF, with respect
to a given object o. Note that ECF is a property of both an execution π and some object o. Specfically,
we are interested in the case where π has a callback to o.
Definition 5.1. A well-formed complete execution κ ⊢ π is equivalently effectively callback-free
for an object o, denoted by dECFofs, if there is a well-formed callback-free run κ ′ ⊢ π ′, which is
final-state equivalent for o to π :
κ ⊢ π ⊨ dECFofs ⇐⇒ ∃κ ′,π ′.κ ⊢ π ≃oFS κ ′ ⊢ π ′ ∧ CBfo (π ′)
We say that the execution κ ′ ⊢ π ′ is a witness for π being a dECFofs execution.
Checking dECFofs is difficult in practice, and undecidable in general for models with an infinite
state. We describe a stronger definition of ECF, based on conflict-equivalence, called ECFc, which
permits an efficient algorithm for checking it. Interestingly, even though executions in our model
do not allow for concurrency, callbacks can be thought of as allowing to express a limited subset
of concurrent executions. In fact, the ECF property in our model is analogous to serializability in
models that permit concurrency. Using this analogy, invocations are analogous to transactions. We
show what this means to reorder invocations in the sequential semantics of SMAC.
ϵ ϵ ϵι11 · · · ι12 · · · ιm2 ιn1 ι13 · · ·
ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵι11 · · · ιn1 ι13 · · · ι12 · · · ιm2
ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵι11 · · · ιn1 ι12 · · · ιm2 ι13 · · ·
ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵι12 · · · ιm2 ι11 ιn1 ι13 · · ·
Fig. 8. The callback reorder process. The first graph represents the original execution, which contains a
callback (in red). The three other graphs represent all possible callback free executions. Red marks the moved
callback transitions. Wave edges indicate that a call was replaced with a havoc transition.
In general terms, ECFc requires to find a callback-free execution which is conflict-equivalent to
the execution with the callbacks. Conflict-equivalence requires that the trace of the callback-free
execution is a permutation of the trace of the original execution. It is thus useful to start with a
characterization of the legal permutations of an execution. Firstly, the permutation may not break
program order of contract code. That is, the permutation must retain the ordering of events whose
transitions are part of the same invocation π , and their state have the same depth as Depth(π ).
Secondly, we want to allow permutations that remove callback invocations from their original call
location, and sets them to execute in a quiescent state, and still receive a modular well-formed
execution.
When we permute a trace such that a callback invocation is removed from its original place, we
replace the call transition leading to the callback with a havoc transition. An example can be seen
in Figure 8, showing all legal permutations of a trace that has a callback-free execution with havoc
transitions.
Remark 5.2. A havoc transition is not part of the permuted trace; it is merely used to justify the
execution which is no longer well-formed as we defined earlier.
Using modular well-formed executions, we can formally define the ECFc property for executions,
dECFc:
Definition 5.3. Awell-formed complete executionκ ⊢ π is conflict-equivalently effectively callback-
free for an object o, denoted by κ ⊢ π ⊨ dECFoc, if there is a modular well-formed callback-free run
κ ⊢ π ′ which is object-conflict-equivalent to π for o:
κ ⊢ π ⊨ dECFoc ⇐⇒ ∃π ′.κ ⊢ π ≃oC κ ⊢ π ′ ∧ CBfo (π ′) .
It is easy to prove that conflict equivalence implies final-state equivalence (see, e.g., [Bernstein
et al. 1987]). Thus, it can be concluded that ECFc implies ECFfs as, by using Proposition 4.8, we can
use the same witness for π being dECFc to prove that π is also dECFfs.
Theorem 5.4. Let π be a well-formed complete execution. If π ⊨ dECFoc then π ⊨ dECFofs.
Proof. Since κ ⊢ π ⊨ dECFoc, there is a callback-free modular well-formed complete execution
κ ⊢ π ′ such that κ ⊢ π ≃oC κ ⊢ π ′. It is easy to see that since CBfo (π ′) then π ′ |o is too a callback-free
and modular well-formed run. From an immediate generalization of Proposition 4.8 to runs, we
conclude that for κ ⊢ π ′ |o there is a context κ ′ and a well-formed run κ ′ ⊢ πˆ such that κ ′(o) = κ(o),
andT (π ′ |o) = T (πˆ |o). It should be noted that the equality of the trace projected on o implies callback-
freedom for o is retained: namely, CBfo (πˆ ). Conflict equivalence implies final-state equivalence
([Bernstein et al. 1987]), hence, src(π ) = src(π ′) and trg(π ) = trg(π ′). Also, because conflict ordering
in primitive commands of o is retained between π ′ |o and πˆ |o , we conclude that π ′ ≃oFS πˆ , therefore
src(π ′) = src(πˆ ) and trg(π ′) = trg(πˆ ). It can be concluded then that since (i) src(π ) = src(πˆ ) and
trg(π ) = trg(πˆ ), (ii) κ(o) = κ ′(o), and (iii) πˆ is well-formed, then: π ≃oFS πˆ . making κ ′ ⊢ πˆ a witness
proving π ⊨ dECFofs. □
Finally, as we are also interested in ECF as a property of objects (sECF), we extend the definitions
of ECFfs and ECFc to objects (sECFfs and sECFc) instead of executions (dECFfs and dECFc), which
we refer to as static ECF.
Definition 5.5. An object o is sECFfs if for every complete execution κ ⊢ π it holds that
κ ⊢ π ⊨ dECFofs. o is sECFc if for every complete execution κ ⊢ π it holds that κ ⊢ π ⊨ dECFoc .
6 DECIDABILITY
This section discusses the decidability of verifying ECF. Using Rice Theorem (see, e.g., Hopcroft et al.
[2006]), it is easy to show that verifying sECF, namely, statically verifying whether all executions of
an object are ECFfs or ECFc, is an undecidable problem. Interestingly, checking ECFfs for a single
execution (dECFofs) is also undecidable.
Theorem 6.1. Given an execution κ ⊢ π , checking if it is dECFofs is undecidable.
Proof. We show a reduction from the halting problem. SMAC is Turing-complete, thus we
encode the operation of a Turing machineM as a command c ∈ Cmd. In Figure 9, we present the
code of a contract A. The store of A has a single field X initialized as 0, and a single argument
denoted arд. The field X is unchanged byM . We also write the code of a contract B. The method of
A is separated to 3 branches. If X , 0, 1 then the method returns without any effect. If X = 1, then
X is updated to 2 and the method returns. If X = 0, then X is updated to 1 and if the argument is
equal 0, we execute the TMM and update X to 2 if and whenM finished running. If the argument
is not equal 0, we call contract B. If right after B’s execution X is not equal 2, thenX is updated
to 3. The code of B is calling to A. Therefore, when A calls B, B always creates a callback to A. We
consider the execution π starting from the initial state in which A’s X field is equal 0, with arд , 0.
This execution calls the object B, which calls back to A, and in the callback the value of X is set to 2.
We show that π is dECFofs if and only ifM() halts. For the ‘if’ direction, we note that ifM() halts,
then the execution of A(0) from the state where X = 0 leads to X being set to 2 right after M’s
run finished, and that execution has no callbacks, as required. For the ‘only if’ direction, we note
that the only callback-free execution that starts from X = 0 and ends with X = 2 is the call A(0),
which is the execution that executesM(), and it is a legal execution only ifM() halts. The reason
that this must be the only execution, is that for any choice of input argument arд , 0 and context
κ that maps a different code for B, does not allow reaching the required final state X = 2 unless
callbacks are used. If κ(B) still calls back to A then clearly the resulting execution is not an eligible
ECF witness. If κ(B) does not call back to A, then X is updated to 3. Therefore, when X = 3, any
subsequent call to A cannot modify X , and in particular X = 2 is not reachable. □
In contrast, checking ECFc for a single execution (dECFc) is obviously decidable, as we can
enumerate all of the permutations of a particular input trace.
Thus, we focus on verifying sECF, namely, statically verifying whether all executions of an object
are ECFfs or ECFc, where the domains of the object variables are restricted to finite sets. Hence,
such objects can be modeled with a pushdown-automaton (PDA). Such a PDA for an object o is
able to simulate any modular well-formed execution κ ∈ π where the active object of all states in
π is o. We denote this construction Ao . Its code is shown in the left side of Figure 10. It executes
the code of o with a non-deterministically chosen argument, and replaces every call to an external
object with a sequence of arbitrary calls to o (the code in E), and a non-deterministic choice of the
Object A
int X
M’s fields
enter (arg)
if X == 0 then
X := 1
if arg != 0 then
B()
if X != 2 then X := 3
else
run M()
X := 2
else if X == 1 then
X := 2
return
Object B
enter
A(0)
return
qX=0 eAX=0
X :=1A(a) a=
0
a,0
M () X :=2
rA
B()
eB
A(0)
ecbAX=1
X :=2
rB rA
X ,2X := 3
qX=3
qX=2
Fig. 9. The codes of two objects A and B showing that dECFofs is undecidable, and a diagram showing the
possible flows of the system. Nodes marked q are quiescent states, with the current value of A’s X variable in
subscript. Nodes starting with eo indicate entry to an object o, and ro a return from an object o. The notation
ecbo indicates the call is a callback. Entry nodes are marked with the value of X for better readability. Syntactic
references to the code (assignments, calls, conditions) appear on the edges. Missing call edges from quiescent
states indicate that the resulting quiescent state is the same, hence, qX=2 and qX=3 are sinks.
Ao
arg = *;
... // Code of o
x := o’(y) --> E(); x := *;
...
E = while (*)
arg = *;
o(arg);
A0o
arg = *;
... // Code of o
x := o’(y) --> x := *;
...
Fig. 10. The construction of automatons Ao and A0o . The notation --> indicates that a command in the code
of o is replaced with another.
return value of the call. We begin with a rather simple lemma that shows ECFfs of objects is indeed
decidable in this model. We assume that variables may take values coming from a finite domain.
Lemma 6.2. Let o be an object, assuming a finite domain for variables. Then there is an algorithm
that decides if o is sECFfs.
Proof. We consider the pushdown automaton Ao and an automaton that allows only callback-
free behaviors for o,A0o . Both are shown in Figure 10. Each execution ofAo consists of first choosing
non-deterministically an argument arд with which the object o is called. The automaton simulates
the steps of o with the only difference being in invocations of other objects, e.g. o′. This command
is replaced with the code of the “environment” object E, that performs a sequence of calls to o with
an arbitrary argument chosen in each iteration. The sequence length is arbitrary and may be also
0, i.e., no callbacks. After running the callbacks, the automaton non-deterministically chooses a
return value, stored in the original variable intended to store the return value of o′, which in the
figure is the variable x .
The automaton that allows only callback-free behaviors for o is simpler: the only difference is
that it does not run the code of E. In fact, A0o is a finite state machine.
We now utilize the result by [Bouajjani et al. 1997] for reachability of a regular set of config-
urations of a pushdown automaton. Here, the set of configurations is State, and the subset of
configurations which we are interested in is the one with with an empty stack, i.e. {()} × Σo where
Σo is the set of o’s possible states, which is finite and thus regular.
We consider an arbitrary pair of states σ1,σ2 ∈ Σo . We first check if there is an execution of Ao
starting from σ1 and ending in σ2. This can be done by checking if σ1 is reachable from the initial
state and as well as if σ2 is reachable from σ1. As the path that shows reachability in Ao may not be
callback-free, we check for reachability also in the finite state machine A0o , in the same manner.
Reachability in finite-state machines is known to be decidable. If there is no execution in A0o from
σ1 to σ2, then the object o is not sECFfs. After checking for all pairs in Σo × Σo that for each pair
of states (σ1,σ2) there is an execution of Ao starting in σ1 and ending in σ2 if and only if there is
such an execution in A0o , we verified that o is sECFfs. The set of all pairs of states is finite, thus it
describes a decision procedure for verifying sECFfs for an object o.
□
Showing the decidability of sECFc of objects is not that easy, because it requires reasoning on
permutations of events, which is not a regular property, even in the case of finite-state machines.
Our strategy for proving the decidability of sECFc will be as follows. As before, we consider
executions of Ao , which identify with the set of possible projected executions on o. We will show
that it is enough to check subexecutions of Ao which involve at most two elements of the stack.
Namely, it is the same as checking the set of executions ofAo with a limit of two to the depth of the
stack, where the initial state of the execution may include both the initial states Σo of an execution of
Ao , and in addition any state s where a callback may be called. Explicitly, s is a state whose primitive
command is a call. We describe such states using the set I0 = {s | ∃x ,o′, e .C(top(s)) = x B o′(e)}.
It is regular as we only consider the top element of the stack. Finding for the set of states I0 its
subset of reachable states in Ao can therefore be done using [Bouajjani et al. 1997].
We denote by A2o the automaton that is received by limiting the stack depth of Ao to two, and
having initial states I0 ∪ Σo . For A2o , deciding if all its executions are dECFoc is decidable. We do so
by constructing a monitor that receives as input execution traces of A2o and outputs an error if the
executions are not dECFoc. Then we will show thatM is a finite state machine and thus checking
reachability of its error states is decidable. Such a construction is possible because even though
conflict-equivalence demands finding a permutation of a trace, which is not a regular property, the
actual choice of permutations that have to be checked is much more limited.
Lemma 6.3. Let Π denote the set of all executions of A2o . There is an automaton M that for each
π ∈ Π, ends in an accepting state if π ⊨ dECFoc, and in a rejecting state otherwise.
Proof. We write the code of the automatonM in Figure 11. The automaton loops on each event
in the trace of the execution. The automaton states consist of a depth variable d, and two pairs of
read and write sets: prefix and delayedCbs. The sets R and W are updated in each command that
reads from or writes to the object store. They are reset when a callback starts or ends. The prefix
pair retains the accumulated reads and writes in the invocations at depth 1, i.e. the first invocation
of o and which we refer to sometimes as the main invocation. The delayedCbs pair retains the
accumulated reads and writes by callbacks that we choose to execute after the main invocation
ends.
M (π ) =
d = 0, prefix = (∅, ∅), delayedCbs = (∅, ∅)
for (e ∈ T (π ))
if (c(e) = x B F)
R := R∪{F }
if (c(e) = F B x)
W := W∪{F }
if (c(e) = enter && d=0) // Execution starts
R, W := (∅, ∅)
d := d+1
if (c(e) = return && d=1) // Execution ends
assert((R,W) commutes with delayedCbs)
R, W := (∅, ∅)
d := d-1
return
if (c(e) = enter && d=1) // Callback starts
assert((R,W) commutes with delayedCbs)
prefix := (R(prefix) ∪ R, W(prefix) ∪ W)
R, W := (∅, ∅)
d := d+1
if (c(e) = return && d=2) // Callback ends
if (!((R,W) commutes with prefix) || !((R,W) commutes with delayedCbs))
delayedCbs := (R(delayedCbs) ∪ R, W(delayedCbs) ∪ W)
R, W := (∅, ∅)
d := d-1
Fig. 11. The code ofM which accepts an execution π of A2o and verifies if it is dECF
o
c
Intuitively, the monitor checks each time a pair of (R,W) is finalized and before it is reset, if it
satisfies conditions that will allow to find a conflict-equivalent execution. For a callback execution,
we check if the pair commutes with the prefix, i.e. all portions of the main invocation already
executed. If it does not commute with the prefix, we mark it as a delayed callback, and update the
delayedCbs read and write sets. As we do not know whether delayed callbacks actually commute
with the rest of the invocation, and with future callbacks that may be executed before the main
invocation, we retain the conflict information in delayedCbs to be checked later against any
finalized (R,W) sets that is belonging either to the main invocation, or to a callback that is chosen
to be executed before the main invocation. Therefore, even in the case when a callback commutes
with the prefix, but in which it does not commute with the delayed callbacks (which are ‘jumping
over’ the callback under consideration in order of execution), we have to try to execute it as a
delayed callback as well. Otherwise, the execution is surely not dECFoc, and we move to an error
state. For a portion of the main invocation (the first or last one, or between callbacks), we check
if it does not conflict with any of the relevant delayed callbacks. The delayedCbs pair is always
updated correctly with the currently delayed callbacks’ read and write locations.
It can be seen from the construction that ifM accepts, then we can build fromM’s execution a
witness for π being dECFoc by ordering all non-delayed callbacks before the main invocation and
the delayed callbacks after the main invocation, both of those in the order in which they appear in
the original execution. E.g., if callbacks i1 and i2 are both delayed callbacks, then if i1 is executed
before i2 in π then the ordering between them in the witness is not changed. The same argument
applies for non-delayed callbacks.
In addition, if o is dECFoc thenM must accept. This is because any witness for π being dECFoc
is conflict-equivalent to the witness implicitly produced by M . The reason for that is that in the
witness, we can also identify a set of callbacks executed before the main invocation and a set of
callbacks executed after it. The internal ordering of callbacks that are executed before the main
invocation does not matter as long as it does not reorder conflicts, and thus may in fact be the same
as in the original execution, ditto for the other set of callbacks. □
We note thatM has a finite state: d in {0, 1, 2}, and prefix and delayedCbs in 2F × 2F where F
is the set of o’s fields. Therefore,M is a finite state machine, and thus reachability is decidable. In
particular, we can check if the error states are reachable. However,M is a machine that works on
any execution of any object. It is not difficult, though, to buildM as a monitor of A2o . We denote
this constructionMA2o . The result is still a finite state machine with decidable reachability, since A
2
o ,
which has a bounded stack depth of 2, is also a finite state machine.
Corollary 6.4. It is decidable to check if all executions of A2o are dECFoc
We now show that the previous corollary implies that if all executions of A2o are dECFoc, then
then so are all executions of Ao . In particular, it shows that o is sECFc. Importantly, the converse is
also true: if an object o is sECFc, then all executions of A2o are dECFoc. This is trivial to show: for
an execution π of A2o such that π¬⊨dECFoc it is easy to find a complete execution π ′ in Ao of the
form π ′ = π0πˆπ ′0 which is also not dECFoc. Specifically, π0 will be a subexecution that reaches the
initial state of π , πˆ will be identical to π , only changing the stacks in π ’s states to account for π0’s
transitions, and π ′0 will complete the execution. Any permutation of T (π ′) will induce a conflict
equivalence breaking permutation on πˆ , whose conflicts are the same as those of π , therefore π ′ is
not dECFoc.
Lemma 6.5. An object o is sECFc if all executions of A2o are dECFoc.
Proof. We show that for every execution π of Ao there is a witness π ′ for it being dECFoc. The
witness is built recursively. We initialize π ′ = π . We denote D = maxDepth(π ). We start with
the longest subexecution in π0 ⊑ π which has maxDepth(π0) = D and minDepth(π0) = D − 1. By
ignoring the first D − 2 stack frames, π0 can be seen as an execution of A2o , thus it is dECFoc. Hence,
by taking the witness in A2o and returning the first D − 2 stack frames, we have a subexecution
π ′0 ≃oC π0 which is callback-free:minDepth(π ′0) = maxDepth(π ′0) = D−1. We update π ′ by replacing
the transitions of π0 with π ′0. The process continues by taking in each step the longest and deepest
subexecution which has a callback and replacing it with a callback-free subexecution which is
conflict-equivalent to it. In each step, the resulting π ′ is conflict-equivalent to π . The premise of
the lemma ensures that this process will not stop until π ′ is callback-free. □
From Corollary 6.4 and Lemma 6.5 we immediately get the following result:
Theorem 6.6. Let o be an object, assuming a finite domain for variables. Then there is an algorithm
that decides if o is sECFc.
7 OBJECT-LEVEL ANALYSIS
While the ECF property is capable of detecting unwanted executions which do not satisfy it, it
can be further used for modular analysis of objects. We will show that in environments in which
objects are encapsulated, we can consider ECF for executions of a single object only, to help simplify
object-level analysis.
We define the notion of a most general client (MGC) in our model. The most general client for
an object o, MGCo , is an external program that works on a system that includes a single object
in the store. The store σ of MGCo contains a single object NoCB(o), which is built based on the
original object o. Every invocation of an object of the form x B o′(e) in o is replaced with a non-
deterministic choice of the value of x as returned by the call, in correspondence with the definition
of havoc transitions in Section 5. Furthermore,MGCo is allowed to repeatedly callNoCB(o)with any
parameter and in any order. As such, the semantics ofMGCo soundly approximate all executions
of the object o (see, e.g., Gotsman and Yang [2011]), while every execution in MGCo is in fact a
projected, callback-free execution of o.
We show that, if the object o is ECF in the general model, then any object-level assertion can be
soundly verified onMGCo . This is because, all reachable states of an object o in any arbitrary code
context κ that does not change o’s code, are reachable in the system containing only NoCB(o).
Theorem 7.1. Let R be the set of all states of the object o in a quiescent state, and let R0 be the set
of all states of the object o in a run ofMGCo . If o is sECFfs then R0 ⊃ R.
Clearly, the theorem holds if the object is shown to be sECFc, since this implies it is also sECFfs
(see Theorem 5.4).
This analysis is not overly imprecise, since in real environments, such as Ethereum, we could
simulate such behaviors. This is particularly correct since in Ethereum the store of the objects is
updateable, and new objects may be added to the system.
Importantly, the analysis simply assumes ECF, and does not require to prove it: An alternative
formulation of Theorem 7.1 is assuming that the runtime system enforces dECF on all executions.
In that case, the analysis is still sound. It is not unreasonable to assume such a dynamic analysis of
dECF, because we found out an efficient method to verify it, presented in Section 8.
We illustrate Theorem 7.1 using the example shown in Figure 1. We implemented Dao as a
class in Dafny [Leino 2010] with two methods: deposit and withdrawAll, whose pre- and post-
conditions capture the object invariant which should be valid after every execution of the Dao
object. Primarily, we wish to ensure that the data elements in the credit map are not negative,
and that the sum of all these elements is equal to the balance of the Dao. We model the pay method
without the recursive call to withdrawAll, but annotate it as possibly modifying (any field of)
the Dao object. This annotation generalizes the possible behaviors of the Dao object without the
ECF property. With such weak assumptions, and perhaps unsurprisingly, Dafny fails to verify the
postconditions for both the original and the fixed versions of the Dao object. In contrast, when we
assume that the ECF property holds, technically by adding a postcondition to pay which ensures
that the previously read fields of the Dao object, i.e., balance and credit[o], are not modified,
Dafny is able to establish the post condition. Theorem 7.1 implies the fixed Dao contract respects
the given specification when executed using the original runtime system and the original DAO
object respects the specification if it is executed on a runtime system which enforces ECF.
8 DYNAMIC VERIFICATION
We describe a sound procedure for verifying the dECFc property dynamically. More precisely, for
each execution, it checks for every object that participates in the execution, if the subsequence of
the transitions that pertain only to that object (the projected execution) is ECFc. We assume the
existence of an interpreter or virtual machine implementing the semantics defined in Section 3.
Below is a description of the data structures used by the algorithm, as well as the instrumentation
of the object code to maintain these data structures. We then present a higher-level description of
the algorithm, followed with pseudo-code and a complexity analysis. We use the example presented
in the overview section in Figure 1 to explain the procedure.
The general structure of the procedure is that the instrumentation step starts every time we
exit a quiescent state, and ends when we reach the next quiescent state. Once instrumentation has
completed, the algorithm runs on the instrumented structures and returns whether all projected
executions derived from the execution are ECF. The procedure repeats each time we enter an active
state.
8.1 Data Structures
A segment is a data structure that captures metadata about a portion of the execution’s states.
This portion consists of a sequence of adjacent transitions, whose top stack frames have the same
active object. That is, an invocation of a different object marks the beginning of a new segment, as
well as returning from an invocation to a caller invocation which is executed in the context of a
different object. However, a call from one object to itself does not break the current segment (This
is motivated by the definition of callbacks in Section 5). In simpler terms, a new segment is defined
each time the active object changes, either when we push a stack frame with a different object, or
pop a stack frame such that the new top frame has a different active object. We show how segments
are determined in the instrumentation in Figure 12, using hooks on calls and returns.
Example 8.1. In the example DAO contract in Section 2, an attack execution consists of 6 segments:
(1) the first invocation of withdrawAll, lines 1-3; (2) an invocation of pay, lines 3-5; (3) the second
invocation of withdrawAll, lines 1-3; (4) a full invocation of pay, lines 3-4,7; (5) the second
invocation of withdrawAll, line 5; (6) the first invocation of withdrawAll, line 5;
Definition 8.2 (Segments). A segment t is representative of a maximal sequence of adjacent
transitions pertaining to the same object. A segment t = (R,W ,D, Idx) contains information about
fields accessed in the segment, denoted R(t) andW (t) for the read- and write- sets, respectively. In
addition, a segment contains information about the depth of the invocation (denoted D(t)), which
is equal to the depth of the transitions’ states. Last, the index in the execution (denoted Idx(t)), is
strictly increasing according to order of creation of the segments.
The primary metadata saved in each segment is the read and write sets of the fields of the object
that were accessed by commands executed in the transitions that pertain to the segment. Other
metadata includes the depth of the invocations in the stack, and an index to maintain the order of
the segments in the execution.
Example 8.3. We write down the segments that pertain to the DAO object in the overview example
of the attack execution, in the same order as they appear in the execution:
t1 = ({credit[Attacker], balance}, {balance}, 0, 1) t2 = ({credit[Attacker], balance}, {balance}, 1, 2)
t3 = ({}, {credit[Attacker]}, 1, 3) t4 = ({}, {credit[Attacker]}, 0, 4)
An execution can be represented as a linear sequence of segments. Furthermore, from these
segments we can determine the invocations that the execution contains.
Remark 8.4. Segments can be used as an alternative representation of executions and invocations,
that generalize data saved by a sequence of transitions. In this section only, we redefine the notions of
executions and invocations to refer to segments instead of transitions.
Definition 8.5 (Executions, Invocations, and Callbacks). An execution can be represented using
a sequence of its instrumented segments π = (t1, . . . , tn). We can access the j’th segment of the
execution using π (j) = tj . We trivially have that Idx(tj ) = j . An invocation is a sequence of segments
I = (tI1, . . . , tIk) such that there is a number d for which all of the following holds:
(1) ∀t ∈ I .D(t) = d (all segments of the invocation are in the same depth).
(2) d > D(π (Idx(t I1) − 1)) (the first segment before the first segment in the invocation has lower
depth, proving it is indeed the beginning of an invocation).
(3) d > D(π (Idx(t Ik ) + 1)) (the first segment after the last segment in the invocations has lower
depth, proving it is indeed the end of an invocation).
(4) ∀j .Idx(t I1) < j < Idx(t Ik ) =⇒ D(π (j)) ≥ d (the invocation does not end before the last
segment, that is all segments of depth d in the given range belong to the same invocation).
As all segments included in the invocation has the same depthd , we denote the depth of an invocation
by D(I ) = d. We say that an invocation I is a callback in another invocation I ′ (denoted I ⊑ I ′) if
Idx(I (1)) > Idx(I ′(1)) ∧ Idx(I (1)) < Idx(I ′(|I ′ |)).
Remark 8.6. Unlike the definition of invocations in Section 3, here invocations capture only the
transitions in the same depth as the depth of its first transition, and not transitions in higher depth.
This allows to define D(I ) for an invocation I .
Example 8.7. In the attack execution presented in Section 2, the first invocation of withdrawAll
is Iwd1 = (t1, t4), and the second invocation is Iwd2 = (t2, t3). Iwd2 is a callback of Iwd1 : Iwd2 ⊑ Iwd1 .
We associate with each segment in depth > 1 a prefix-set and suffix-set of all segments in the
caller that precede, or respectively, proceed it:
Definition 8.8 (Prefix and Suffix segments). Let a set of segments representing an invocation
I = (ticaller ), and a single segment tcb with D(tcb) > D(I ) and Idx(tcb) ∈ {Idx(I (1)), . . . , Idx(I (|I |))}.
We define for tcb its prefix and suffix sets relatively to a caller I by partitioning the segment in I
to segments whose index in the execution is smaller than the index of the callback segment tcb
(prefix), and segments whose index in the execution is larger than it (suffix):
prefix(I , tcb) = {tcaller ∈ I | Idx(tcaller ) < Idx(tcb)}
suffix(I , tcb) = {tcaller ∈ I | Idx(tcaller ) > Idx(tcb)}
Example 8.9. The prefix and suffix segments of t2 and t3 with respect to Iwd1 are:
prefix(Iwd1 , t2) = prefix(Iwd1 , t3) = {t1}
suffix(Iwd1 , t2) = suffix(Iwd1 , t3) = {t4}
The instrumentation process creates the segments and the invocations. We show pseudo-code of
the instrumentation procedure in Figure 12.
The basic check on segments is the commutativity check. We define segment commutativity
using read and write sets. We will show that we actually check commutativity of a segment with
either a prefix or suffix segment. As the prefix/suffix segments are sets of segments, the read and
write sets of prefix/suffix segments are a union of the respective read and write sets of all the
segments contained in the prefix or suffix segment.
Definition 8.10 (Commutative Segments). Segments t1 and t2 commute, denoted by t1 ⇄ t2, if:
t1 ⇄ t2 def= R(t1) ∩W (t2) = ∅ ∧ R(t2) ∩W (t1) = ∅ ∧W (t1) ∩W (t2) = ∅
If segments t1 and t2 do not commute, we denote this by t1 ⇄̸ t2.
Example 8.11. In the attack execution presented in Section 2, indeed we have that t2 ⇄̸ t1, as
R(t1) ∩W (t2) = {balance}. Similarly, t3 ⇄̸ t1 because of credit[o], as R(t1) ∩W (t3) = {credit[o]}, and
therefore also t2 ⇄̸ t4. However, t3 does commute with t4: t3 ⇄ t4.
8.2 Algorithm
We start with a high-level description of the algorithm. The algorithm is called every time the
system reaches a quiescent state, working on the last complete execution. The algorithm generates
a relation of invocations that defines constraints on the ordering of invocations in different stack
depths, similar to a ‘happens-before’ [Lamport 1978] relation. We name this relation the invocation
order constraint (IOC) graph. For example, if a segment t of a callback invocation Icb is not commuting
with its prefix with respect to one of its calling invocations tcaller (i.e., t ⇄̸ prefix(Icaller , t)), then we
Segment { Obj , Caller , R, W, D, I }
Invocation { Caller , Obj }
Init ():
execution := ()
curSegment := ⊥
invocations := Map <Invocation -> Segment>
UponInvocation(object ):
if fromQuiescent // Procedure starts
Init()
if object != curSegment.Obj
caller := fromQuiescent ? TopInvocation : curSegment.Caller
inv := Invocation(caller , object)
AddSegment(object , inv , curSegment.D+1, curSegment.I+1)
UponReturn(object ):
caller := toQuiescent ? TopInvocation : curSegment.Caller.Caller
if caller.Obj != object
AddSegment(object , caller , curSegment.D-1, curSegment.I+1)
if caller == TopInvocation // End of instrumentation step
CheckECFForAllObjects () // Run the algorithm , and finish procedure
AddSegment(object , caller , D, I):
segment := Segment(object , caller , {}, {}, D, I)
Append(execution , segment)
Append(invocations[caller], segment)
curSegment := segment
UponObjectVarRead(object , F):
curSegment.R[F] := 1
UponObjectVarWrite(object , F):
curSegment.W[F] := 1
Fig. 12. Instrumentation procedures, implemented as hooks called upon call commands, return commands,
and object variable read/write access command. Generates the execution, which is a list of segments, and
invocations, a map of invocation identifiers to an invocation object keeping the caller of an invocation and
the list of segments that are part of the invocation in the same depth. The top-level invocation is identified as
TopInvocation.
add the constraint that the invocation of the caller has to occur before the callback: Icaller ≺Inv Icb.
The IOC relation of invocations is thus defined as:
I ≺Inv I ′ def= (I ′ ⊑ I ∧ ∃t ∈ I ′.t ⇄̸ prefix(I , t))
∨(I ⊑ I ′ ∧ ∃t ∈ I .t ⇄̸ suffix(I ′, t))
Example 8.12. The IOC relation of the attack execution in Section 2 can be easily calculated with
the previous metadata given in examples 8.9 and 8.11. We have that Iwd1 ≺Inv Iwd2 as Iwd2 ⊑ Iwd1 and
for t2 ∈ Iwd2 , t2 ⇄̸ prefix(Iwd1 , t2). Similarly, Iwd2 ≺Inv Iwd1 as for t2 ∈ Iwd2 , t2 ⇄̸ suffix(Iwd1 , t2).
After the IOC relation is defined, the algorithm considers the graph induced by this relation,
and checks it has no cycles. A cycle in the graph could appear if, for example, there is a callback
invocation and some caller invocation that contains it, for which there is both (1) a segment that
does not commute with its prefix with respect to the caller; and (2) a segment that does not commute
with its suffix with respect to the caller. As each vertex in this graph represents an invocation, the
topological sorting returns an ordering of the invocations, which is ECFc. We are merely interested
if there is such a topological sorting, that is, if the IOC relation does not contain a cycle.
Theorem 8.13. Let π be an execution and let Inv be a map of the instrumented invocations to their
segments. We denote by ≺Inv the IOC on Inv. If ≺Inv has no cycle, then π is ECFc.
Proof. We assume ≺Inv has no cycle. We take a total order ≺tInv of Inv induced by the transitive
closure on ≺Inv . From ≺tInv we build a run π ′ such that every invocation in Inv starts in a quiescent
state in the order determined by ≺tInv . π ′ is conflict-equivalent to π . To show this, we consider two
transitions τ1 and τ2 which conflict in π . If τ1 and τ2 are both captured in the same segment during
instrumentation, then their ordering is kept in π ′ which only reorders invocations. In particular, the
program order of invocations is kept. The same argument applies when τ1 and τ2 are not captured
by the same segment, but their respective segments are both part of the same invocation. In the
general case, τ1 and τ2 each belong to different segments, pertaining to different invocations. In
that case, their ordering in π ′ is kept as ≺tInv respects that conflict. □
Example 8.14. In continuation to our running example, it is immediate that the IOC relation of
the attack execution on the DAO object has a cycle: Iwd1 ≺Inv Iwd2 ≺Inv Iwd1 . Therefore, the algorithm
cannot determine the attack execution is ECFc. But indeed, the attack execution is not ECF, thus it
cannot be ECFc.
We already saw in Section 7 that due to state encapsulation, ECF is a modular property. Therefore,
the procedure may either check ECF for the entire execution, by searching for a cycle in the full
IOC relation, or to check ECF for one object at a time. A modular ECF check can be done by
projecting the relation only on invocations of the object under examination. To align with the
actual implementation of the algorithm, we chose to present it in its modular version here as well.
We give the complete pseudo-code of the algorithm in Figure 13. It begins with an additional step
of preprocessing which is calculating the commutativity matrix of all segments against all prefix
and suffix segments of all their enclosing invocations (invocations that directly or indirectly call the
invocation in which the segment is included). The commutativity matrix assists in calculating the
IOC relation. We then iterate over all objects encountered in the execution, project the IOC relation
on a single object in each iteration, and check if it has a cycle. If the check returns that it is a DAG,
then we verified the projected execution is ECF. Otherwise, the cycle describes the invocations
which cannot be moved, and helps identify the callbacks that cause the violation of ECF.
8.3 Complexity
8.3.1 Time. The instrumentation step adds a constant factor of work to the runtime. To analyze
the algorithm, we begin by looking at the preprocessing steps first. Let n denote the number
of invocations and m the number of segments (n < m). In addition, let k denote the maximal
number of object variables accessed in an object participating in the execution (k < m). The
CalculateCommutativityMatrix procedure loops on all invocations and all segments. For each
pair of an invocation and a segment, the encloses predicate can be implemented to take constant
time. The calculation of the prefix set and suffix set is taking time linear in the number of segments in
an invocation, bounded bym. The time to calculate the read and write sets of the prefix and the suffix
set is linear in k . Commutativity check, which involves checking set intersection, where our sets are
implemented as associative arrays, is linear ink . Thus the time of CalculateCommutativityMatrix
is O(nm(m + k)) = O(nm2). For CalculateIOCRelation, we have a loop over pairs of invocations,
and another pair of non-nested loops over segments in an invocation, giving O(mn2). Projecting
the IOC relation is linear in its size which is O(n2). The isDAG check is linear in the size of the
CheckECFForAllObjects ():
commute_matrix := CalculateCommutativityMatrix ()
hbRelation := CalculateIOCRelation(commute_matrix)
for each unique object in execution:
if not CheckECF(object ):
Print "Object " object " is not ECF"
CheckECF(object ):
// It is guaranteed that IOC applies only to invocations of the same object
hbRelationO := project hbRelation on invocations of object only
return isDAG(hbRelation)
CalculateCommutativityMatrix ():
matrix := new Map <Invocation , Segment -> Bool , Bool >
for each inv in invocations , segment in execution
if encloses(inv , segment)
prefix := (s for s in inv where s.I < segment.I)
suffix := (s for s in inv where s.I > segment.I)
prefixRS , prefixWS := Union(s.R for s in prefix), Union(s.W for s in prefix)
suffixRS , suffixWS := Union(s.R for s in suffix), Union(s.W for s in suffix)
prefixCommute := isCommutative(prefixRS , prefixWS , segment.R, segment.W)
suffixCommute := isCommutative(suffixRS , suffixWS , segment.R, segment.W)
if prefixCommute == False && suffixCommute == False
Abort("Not ECF")
matrix[inv , segment] := prefixCommute , suffixCommute
return matrix
encloses(inv , segment ):
return inv.Obj = segment.Obj
&& segment.I between first segment and last segment in inv
CalculateIOCRelation(commute_matrix ):
rel := new Map <Invocation , Invocation -> Bool >
for each inv1 , inv2 in invocations
if encloses(inv1 , first segment in inv2)
for each segment in inv2
if commute_matrix[inv1 , segment] == False , True
rel[inv1 , inv2] := True
if encloses(inv2 , first segment in inv1)
for each segment in inv1
if commute_matrix[inv2 , segment] == True , False
rel[inv1 , inv2] := True
Fig. 13. Algorithm for verifying ECF of an execution. The code of isDAG and isCommutative is not given.
The definition of isCommutative is given according to Definition 8.10.
projected relation, which is bounded byO(n2). (The graph it represents hasO(n) vertices andO(n2)
edges, and checking for a graph to be a DAG is O(|V | + |E |)). In total, we have O(nm2).
8.3.2 Space. The instrumentation adds O(m) space for keeping the segments, and O(nm) for
keeping the invocations. The commutativity matrix takes O(nm) space, and the IOC relation takes
O(n2) space. Therefore, the space complexity of the algorithm is O(nm).
9 EVALUATION
We developed a prototype implementation for a dynamic monitor verifying ECF for Ethereum.6 For
each execution, it checks if any of the participating contracts has a non-ECF (projected) execution,
and outputs all detections of non-ECF executions.7 We ran our experiments by importing the entire
blockchain from its inception on July 30, 2015 until March 30, 2017. 8 The host we used is a 64-bit
Ubuntu 16.04 with two 2.2 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2699 processors (22 cores each with 2 threads per
core) and 256 GB of RAM. Both the instrumentation and the algorithm were integrated directly
into the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) module using hooks, as described in Section 8.
Our monitor operated in “’detect-mode” to avoid affecting the results, and for statistics gathering
only. However, it is trivial to change it to “’prevent-mode”, that actively invalidates and reverts
complete executions which are not ECF. Had all the Ethereum clients used such a monitor by
design, the DAO incident would have been avoided, along with the controversial hard fork. As our
experiments prove, the false-positive rate of the monitor is minuscule: only 10 executions out of
about 100 million were legitimately non-ECF. There is also no concern of performance impact, as the
measured overhead of running the monitor was less than 3.5%. Furthermore, the benchmarks of the
monitor were performed in an ideal environment that actually makes the overhead larger than it is in
a normal environment. The reason behind it is that normal environments have additional overheads
such as networking and disk accesses, which we disabled in order to scale our experiments.
Experiments. In Figure 14, we show a short list of experiments conducted. We also included the
number of contracts created as an additional metric of the blockchain. The primary experiment was
checking for ECF in all executions since the creation of blockchain until March 30, 2017. Of note is
that less than 0.01% of the executions were non-ECF. In the second experiment, we processed all
executions starting from March 30, 2017 until June 23, 2017 9.
It is interesting to compare the results of the first experiment, conducted on a snapshot of the
Ethereum blockchain taken in Mar. 30th, 2017, which we used for benchmarks, to the second
experiment, in which we let our modified client to process all newer executions, until June 23rd,
2017. The number of non-ECF contracts decreased in both absolute quantity and in percentage of
total executions. The newer executions expose the maturity of the network, expressed in both the
number of total contracts created (almost 150%more contracts created in less than 3 months than in
the entire existence of the blockchain, from August 2015 till the snapshot date), and the number of
executions.10 Moreover, the number of executions with callbacks increased significantly, indicating
more complex contracts. In the first experiment there were 128, 670 executions containing callbacks,
and in the second experiment there were 155, 668 executions with callbacks. This amounts to a 641%
increase in the number of callbacks in the later period compared with the earlier period. While the
percentage of executions with callbacks is still only 1% of all executions, the absolute number of
executions with callbacks is large enough to indicate that callbacks are inevitable, either because
they are useful, or necessary. This means that contracts show an increasing use of callbacks, and
thus more complex code, that may be prone to bugs resulting from unintended interaction between
contracts. In both experiments, the overall percentage of non-ECF executions out of the executions
with callbacks, was 1.17%, and less than 0.01% out of all executions.
6The source code is available at https://github.com/shellygr/ECFChecker.
7The monitor was implemented on top of the Go [Pike 2012] client for Ethereum, called geth [Ethereum Foundation 2017a],
version 1.5.9.
8Without delving into the specifics of the blockchain paradigm, executions are organized in a structure called blocks. Our
primary experiment was to import the first 3,444,354 blocks of the main Ethereum blockchain.
9The second experiment processed all blocks from block no. 3,444,355 to block no. 3,918,380.
10Assuming a new block is generated at an almost constant rate, there were 32 executions per block on average in the
second experiment, compared with 23 executions in the first.
Blockchain Date Contracts Executions Callbacks Non-ECF (%)
Ethereum 30.VII.2015-30.III.2017 138,457 81,097,421 128,670 3,315 (0.004%)
Ethereum 30.III.2017-23.VI.2017 203,859 15,311,650 155,662 6 (<0.001%)
Eth. Classic 30.VII.2015-29.VI.2017 91,191 32,494,464 81,731 2,288 (0.007%)
Fig. 14. Experimental results. We use dates to mark the portion of the blockchain checked in the experiment.
The Contracts column shows how many contracts were created (but not necessarily executed) in the relevant
time period. The Executions column records the number of method invocations and the Callbacks column
shows howmany of these invocations were callbacks. Non-ECF column counts howmany non-ECF executions
were detected, and their percentage out of the total number of executions.
Object C
Object Sender
Method call(data, sender)
if (Sender != nil) throw
Sender = sender; ret = this.do(data); Sender = nil
Method do(data)
... // read Sender
Fig. 15. Pattern used by contracts C6, C8 and C9. Sender is initialized to nil. call is a method that throws
when Sender is not nil, and otherwise sets it, calls method do, and nullifies Sender afterwards.
Discussion of non-ECF examples. We present a list of all contracts that demonstrated non-ECF
executions in Figure 16. Contracts C2, C4 are related to the DAO. C2 is the original DAO [Buterin
2016]. C4 is known as ‘The Dark DAO’ [Pfeffer 2016], an object containing a copy of the DAO’s
code, as created by the attack (The mechanism of the DAO was such that, every withdrawal of
funds, manifested in the form of a new object whose code is a copy, or ‘split’, of the DAO code).
Contract C1 is an unrelated contract which suffered a vulnerability very similar to the DAO’s. The
vulnerability, also stemming from non-ECF behavior, was discovered during a security audit and
disclosed shortly before the attack on the DAO [Ethereum Reddit 2016; Vessenes 2016]. Contract
C5 is an exercise published on the blockchain to demonstrate the DAO attack [B9Lab 2017], and
indeed a non-ECF execution was detected. In some contracts, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact
cause of the existence of non-ECF executions, as the only available code is EVM bytecode, which is
not trivial to analyze and reverse. We tried to connect these incognito contracts with their creators
or users. With this approach, we found evidence that C3 is also related to the DAO [p-s-dev 2016].
The contract at C7 [Etherscan 2017] was traced back to Validity Labs [Val 2017]. We contacted
the authors and they provided us with the Solidity source-code of the contract [Validity Labs 2017].
It was deliberately designed to have a DAO-style callback exploit, and was used in their training
workshops to demonstrate its dangers.
The same high-level Solidity code of contracts C6, C8, and C9, were provided to us by their
creators at Ambisafe [Ambisafe 2017]. The pattern used by these contracts gives rise to behaviors
that are purposefully non-ECF. We show a snippet illustrating the pattern in Figure 15. This pattern
is inherently non-ECF.11 The method do assumes the value of Sender is not nil, but this only
11In the formal definition, it actually is ECF, because a call of a contract to itself is not a callback. The contracts under
examination were discovered due to a deviation of our monitor’s implementation from the full definition of ECF. However,
this example can be fitted into a slightly modified pattern which is not-ECF even according to the full definition, by adding
an intermediary contract between call and do.
Name Contract address Execs. Execs. w. cbs. Non-ECF Stack depth
Ethereum Network (ETH)
C1 0xd654bdd32fc99471455e... 924 143 10 3
C2 0xbb9bc244d798123fde78... 274,820 103,064 3,296 2-146
C3 0x34a5451ef61a567ee088... 91 8 1 46
C4 0x304a554a310c7e546dfe... 13,223 2,812 1 3
C5 0x59752433dbe28f5aa59b... 15 6 1 3
C6 0x97361ea911d6348cf2af... 44 42 6 2
C7 0xbf78025535c98f4c605f... 25 22 3 3-9
C8 0x232f3a7723137ced12bc... 144 142 1 2
C9 0x7c525c4e3b273a3afc4b... 35 33 2 2
Ethereum Classic Network (ETC)
C1 0xd654bdd32fc99471455e... 850 143 10 3
C2 0xbb9bc244d798123fde78... 195,428 86,573 805 2-146
C3 0x34a5451ef61a567ee088... 18 9 1 46
C4 0x304a554a310c7e546dfe... 14,150 3,064 1 3
C10 0xf4c64518ea10f995918a... 428 177 11 42-122
C11 0xb136707642a4ea12fb4b... 2,582 305 201 17-20
C12 0x0e0da70933f4c7849fc0... 5,330 3,992 1,259 12-57
Fig. 16. A sample of interesting Non-ECF contracts in Ethereum. Contracts are given a name C1, . . . ,C12, and
are ordered chronologically, by the date of the first non-ECF execution. The Executions and Executions with
callbacks columns show statistics on usage style. The Non-ECF column shows how many executions were
detected as non-ECF. Stack depth column indicates the range of the depths of the non-ECF subexecutions.
Time Memory (max) Memory (end)
Monitor off 16h 17m 5.5GB 803MB
Monitor on 16h 50m (3.38% overhead) 5.5GB (0%) 940MB (17% overhead)
Fig. 17. Performance statistics. Benchmark experiment was importing the Ethereummain network blockchain,
from its creation in July 30, 2015 until March 30, 2017. Compares the import with monitor on or off.
occurs in the context of an invocation of call. The purpose behind this behavior, is to have Sender
act as a lock, protecting against unexpected callbacks. Such a design may be avoided in presence of
a monitor that allows only ECF executions.
The bottom part of the table in Figure 16 shows non-ECF contracts found in Ethereum Classic
[2017]. Ethereum Classic (or ETC) is the continuation of the original Ethereum blockchain following
the controversy of the hard-fork due to the DAO bug. Until July 20, 2016, both blockchains, Ethereum
and Ethereum Classic, contain the same executions, and thus the same non-ECF executions. Our
result and investigation show that all non-ECF executions discovered in the Ethereum Classic
network are of copies of the DAO [Bok Consulting 2016a].
Generally, it is important to stress that: (1) there may be other non-ECF contracts, as crafting
and deploying contracts that exploit non-ECF entails investment of real money, thus requires a
strong incentive to do so; (2) attacking is harder as Ethereum employs (not bullet-proof) heuristics
to limit callbacks; (3) a better playground may be the Ethereum TestNet on which we did not run
the experiment, but may provide insight as a future work.
The actual overhead measured by enabling the ECF monitor is given in Figure 17. We used the
first experiment, where the blocks were imported, as a benchmark. Normally, there is an additional
overhead of network download times, which can vary significantly. The measured overhead is
about 3.5%, when calculating the difference in time of importing the blockchain with the monitor
off, and importing it with the monitor on. We believe the actual overhead is even smaller in most
realistic scenarios. First, most clients import the blockchain using the network, which may cause
unexpected latencies, unrelated to the monitor. Additionally, the process was pointed to a directory
created on a 200 GB RAM disk to improve the scalability of the experiment.12 Most clients use a
physical disk and not a RAM disk. Even if the physical disk is an SSD drive, the experiment slows
down significantly, and takes about 20h (18% more than with a RAM disk).
The additional memory footprint measured in the end of the import is about 140MB, or 17%. It
should be noted, that as the implementation is written in Go, which includes automatic garbage
collection, the memory consumption varies between tests. The relative difference with the monitor
on or off was consistent across repeated tests. The maximal memory used by the process is 5.5GB
and is not related to the monitor. High memory consumption occurred during the processing of
one of the DoS attacks on the blockchain.
10 RELATEDWORK
10.1 Modular Reasoning
Modular reasoning is a topic which has been studied extensively with the seminal works of Hoare
[1972] and Dijkstra [1976]. For more recent studies on modularity we refer the readers to Banerjee
and Naumann [2005]; Leino and Müller [2005].
Averroes [Ali and Lhoták 2013] is a tool for generalizing call-graphs of applications by leaning on
a separate compilation assumption to generate a general stub library for applications. This allows
analysis tools to be modular, as generating full call-graphs is both expensive and imprecise. They
show how encapsulation assumptions and proofs can be leveraged to improve the feasibility and
the precision of analyses. In our work, we give a sufficient condition, ECF, for the ability to soundly
reason about a single object in isolation from any other object.
The work of Leino and Nelson [2002] presents an idiom for verifying if an object behaves as
expected in the presence of callbacks, called Valid/state specification idiom. Every object o maintains
a ‘valid’ bit that indicates if its state is valid, i.e., satisfies its object invariants. The bit should be
true in every first invocation of o in an execution. When o calls a method of another object o′, o
turns off its ‘valid’ bit. This way, if the execution of o′ leads to another method call of o, before the
original call to o completed, the code of o can take into account the fact that its object invariants do
not necessarily hold. The existence of such a ‘valid’ bit is helpful to achieve modular soundness,
that is the ability to reason about an object in isolation. This paper achieves modular soundness by
relying on the encapsulation of the object’s state. Essentially, an ECF object is an object for which
the ‘valid’ bit is always turned on, as it is guaranteed that the object state changes only from within
the object’s methods, and that those methods too are only executed where originally the ‘valid’ bit
would be turned on. Thus, with the assumption on all executions being ECF, there is no need to
define a separate behavior of the code for when the ‘valid’ bit is turned on or off. To enable sound
modular reasoning, we simply ignore external calls and assume any return value returned from
any such external call. We note that the absence of shared state drastically simplify our life.
Logozzo [2009] presents a method for modular inference of class invariants. Specifically, it is
shown that the trace semantics of an isolated class are sound and complete with respect to the trace
semantics of a whole program. The goal is to find the strongest state-based sound class invariant,
12The Ethereum blockchain suffered a DoS attack [Bok Consulting 2016b; StackExchange 2017] affecting the blockchain in
the range of block numbers 2.2M-2.7M, causing all peers participating in the blockchain to make frequent accesses to disk.
Running on a RAM disk was necessary to minimize the runtime of experiments.
that holds in both the isolated and non isolated cases. Abstraction is used in order to compute such
an invariant. If it the class invariant matches the specification of the class, then it is ensured that
the class itself matches the specification even in the context of a whole program. The mentioned
work enables modular reasoning by using abstraction. Our work does not attempt to find such
a sound class invariant, but rather to satisfy the necessary conditions for being able to statically
verify any specification of an object in isolation of other objects. The benefit here is that we do not
depend on the precision of an abstraction, which may output an invariant that overapproximates
the specification, and thus does not meet it.
10.2 Verification of Smart Contracts
Even before the events surrounding the bug in the DAO, there were discussions in the Ethereum
community about formal verification of smart contracts. Following the extreme measures taken to
avert the effects of the attack on the DAO by hard-forking the blockchain and effectively rewrite
its history of executions, the discussion became more wide-spread.
Luu et al. [2016] characterized a class of security bugs in smart contracts called Transaction-
Ordering Dependence (TOD). A contract inflicted with TOD bugs may behave unexpectedly when
there is more than one client using the system and the effect of the execution of one client depends
on whether the other client already executed or not. In both TOD and ECF the bugs arise from the
fact that the execution is performed in an unexpected state of the contract. However, TOD bugs
arise when there is more than one execution (since smart contracts are executed in a distributed
environment), whilst non-ECF arises even in a single execution which contains callbacks. One of
the solutions suggested for TOD bugs is guarded transactions. The idea is to allow contract writers
to define guard conditions which are verified by the virtual machine executing the contract code.
The execution must satisfy the guard condition, otherwise it fails without any effect. However, by
enabling modular reasoning on contracts by proving or asserting at runtime that the executions
are ECF, we can verify similar conditions statically. The only addition that may be required for the
virtual machine is the online ECF check, which we found to be inexpensive in practice. Checking
arbitrary conditions at runtime may either be inefficient, or not expressible enough to specify
fully correct contract behavior. In addition, by verifying at runtime that executions are ECF, we
are already able to detect and prevent executions which are, with high probability, unwanted or
unexpected.
Luu et al. [2016] presents a tool called Oyente [Melonport 2017], based on symbolic execution of
contracts. The tool’s web version reports on the existence of ‘reentrancy bugs’, which is how the
family of bugs such as the bug in the DAO were dubbed by the Ethereum community. We attempted
to verify both ECF and non-ECF contract variations based on the DAO object presented in Figure 1.
We received a report on a ‘reentrancy bug’, even on ECF contracts. We reported the false positives
to the web Oyente team, and will submit the issue request by the camera-ready deadline.
The Why3 [Filliâtre and Paskevich 2013] tool was also applied to verify smart contracts written
in Solidity. This requires whole code analysis and user supplied loop invariants.
Bhargavan et al. [2016] translate a subset of the high-level Solidity language for Smart Contract
development to F*, enabling using F*’s verification framework on Smart Contracts. They also
presented a decompiler for EVM bytecode to F*. Similarly to the Why3 approach, the authors faced
the issue of translating peculiar syntactic features of the smart contract language Solidity to F*.
It should be noted that both F* and Oyente are successful in detecting other bugs, such as
mishandled exceptions. For technical clarity, we omit discussion of the semantics of exceptions and
rollbacks in Ethereum. Primarily, to arrive at general results that can be applied in domains other
than Ethereum, and secondly, to not overbear the reader with technical details on the myriad ways
Ethereum contracts may be invoked, and how exceptions may be handled in each of these ways.
Delmolino et al. [2015] discuss their insights from an educational smart contracts lab they
held, and published example contracts used in the lab. We manually analyzed one such contract,
implementing a rock, paper, scissors game [Delmolino et al. 2016]. We identified several control
paths in which a non-ECF execution might manifest. Specifically, there are two control paths in
registration to the game (in which players provide a sum as bounty), and three additional paths in
the collection of the prize. However, the authors put a constraint on the ability to execute callbacks
by limiting to a minimum the amount of gas available to the execution. gas is a novel concept in
Ethereum that effectively bounds the runtime by associating with each low-level opcode a cost. If
an execution is not provided with enough gas when called, it throws a special out-of-gas exception.
Sergey and Hobor [2017] offer an analogy between the nomenclature of Smart Contracts and that
of concurrent objects. Specifically, the scenario of a contract calling another contract is compared
to cooperative multitasking, in which contract invocation is analogous to the case where the caller
yields control. One of the main challenges mentioned is that of being able to verify contracts in
isolation of other contracts. The ECF property brings us closer to that goal, by allowing to check
properties that can be specified as ‘contract invariants’ in a modular way.
11 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a simple generic correctness condition for callbacks called Effective
Callback Freedom and studied its usefulness. We have shown that it enables modular reasoning in
environments with local-only mutable states like Ethereum. We have also shown that in Ethereum
it can be used to prevent bugs without drastically limiting programming style, and that it can be
checked dynamically with low runtime overhead. In the future, we expect to apply the concept of
ECF and prove its usefulness in other environments such as Microservices and Amazon λ.
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